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NOTES
HAS OREGON TIGHTENED THE PERCEIVED LOOPHOLES
OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION AND




In our nation's past, the trade in Native American artifacts was a profitable
business.' This lucrative trade often led to egregious abuses of American
Indian remains and burial sites.2 In 1990, Congress enacted the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act3 (NAGPRA or the Act) with
a twofold purpose: to return to Native American tribes all remains and
artifacts being housed in museums or any remains or artifacts found on public
lands and to ensure that Native American burial sites would be protected in
the future.4
NAGPRA requires all Native American remains and artifacts in the
possession of federal agencies and museums be cataloged and that all tribes
culturally affiliated with the artifacts or remains be notified.5 After the tribes
have been notified, the artifacts or remains must be returned to any lineal
descendant or culturally affiliated tribe who makes a claim to them.6 Any
Native American remains or artifacts found on federal or tribal lands after the
date the Act was promulgated are owned and/or controlled by the lineal
descendants, the tribe who owns the land where the remains or artifacts were
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39-45 (1992).
2. Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public
Lands, 73 U. CoLO. L. REv. 413, 440 (2002).
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000).
4. Wendy Crowther, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: How
Kennewick Man Uncovered the Problems in NAGPRA, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
269,269 (2000).
5. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3003 (2000).
6. See id. § 3005.
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found, or whichever tribe has the closest cultural affiliation to the remains or
artifacts.7
This note traces the application of NAGPRA to a set of remains found in
Benton County, Washington, the so-called Kennewick Man. The note will
follow the case of the Kennewick Man from first discovery to repatriation of
his remains to a coalition of Pacific Northwest Indian tribes. The note will
then review the subsequent litigation filed by a group of scientists who wished
to study the remains, including the August 30, 2002, decision by a United
States Magistrate Judge that held that the plaintiff scientists would be allowed
to study the remains of Kennewick Man.
Part II of the note details the facts which led to the filing of Bonnichsen v.
United States8 and looks at the history of the proceedings. Part 11 explores
the issues and claims addressed by the parties in Bonnichsen 111' and analyzes
how a United States Magistrate Judge applied NAGPRA to the legal dispute
surrounding the Kennewick Man. Part IV concludes the note.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
In July 1996, two college students found a skull on the banks of the
Columbia River near Kennewick, in Benton County, Washington."° The land
on which the skull was found was federal land under the control of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers" (the Corps). The two students notified the
sheriff's office in Benton County, and the sheriffs office called in the
Kennewick police.' 2 During an investigation by the Kennewick police,
several more bones were found, so the county coroner was brought into the
investigation. 3 The coroner then contacted a local anthropologist, Dr. James
Chatters (Dr. Chatters), to help with the investigation. 4
7. See id.
8. 969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997). For the duration of this note, this case will be referred
to as Bonnichsen L
9. Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Or. 2002). For the duration of
this note, this case will be referred to as Bonnichsen Ill.
10. John Stang, Skull Found on Shore of Columbia, TRI-CrrY HERALD (Kennewick, Pasco
& Richland, Wash.), July 29, 1996.







When Dr. Chatters visited the site, he found a nearly complete skeleton.15
Based upon an initial examination of the remains, Dr. Chatters determined that
the remains were from "an early white pioneer,"' 6 who was in his forties or
fifties when he died.' 7 However, the "preliminary examinations raised more
questions than they answered about the ethnic background of" the skeleton,
so one of the bones was then subjected to radiocarbon testing." Based on this
testing, the age of the skeleton was determined to be "between 9200 and 9600
years old."' 9 The remains became known as Kennewick Man, since they were
found near Kennewick, Washington.20
B. History of Proceedings
1. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - Original Decision to Repatriate
Based upon the calculated age of the skeleton,2' and since the federal land
had been sold to the United States by the Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla
Indian Tribes in 1855,22 the Corps notified several local tribes of the discovery
of the remains.23 After the tribes received notification, five tribes joined
together as a coalition (the Coalition) to claim the discovered remains as an
ancestor to the local Native Americans. 24 The Coalition consisted of the
following tribes: the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the Nez
Perce Tribe of Idaho, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation, the Wanapum, and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakama Indian Nation.25 Following NAGPRA, the Coalition sent a claim for
15. Id.
16. Id. at 277.
17. Id. at276.
18. Bonnichsen 1, 969 F. Supp. at 617.
19. Crowther, supra note 4, at 277.
20. John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical, Political and Legal Implications of
American Archeological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. REV. 1, 46 (2001).
21. Crowther, supra note 4, at 277.
22. Treaty Between the United States and the Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla Tribes
and Bands of Indians in Washington and Oregon Territories, June 9, 1855 (ratified Mar. 8,
1859), reprinted in 2 INDIANAFFAIRS: LAWS &TREATIES 694-98 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904)
(as cited by Maura A. Flood, "Kennewick Man" or "Ancient One" ? - A Matter of Interpre-
tation, 63 MONT. L REV. 39, 43-44 (2002)).
23. Maura A. Flood, "Kennewick Man" or "Ancient One"? - A Matter of Interpretation,
63 MONT. L REv. 39, 44 (2002).
24. Crowther, supra note 4, at 277.
25. Flood, supra note 23, at 44.
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the remains to the Corps.26 If they received custody of the remains, the
Coalition planned to "rebury them immediately in a secret location in
accordance with the tribes' religious customs."" The Coalition also requested
that all scientific study of the remains cease.28
Then, around September 17, 1996, the Corps published a notice in a local
newspaper.29 The publication was entitled "Notice of Intent to Repatriate
Human Remains"3 and included the following:
(1) the notice of repatriation was being issued pursuant to the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25
U.S.C. § 3005(a) ("NAGPRA"), (2) the Corps had determined that
the remains were of Native American ancestry, (3) the Corps had
determined that the remains had been inadvertently discovered on
federal land recognized as the aboriginal land of an Indian tribe,
(4) the Corps had determined that there is a relationship of shared
group identity which can be reasonably traced between the human
remains and five Columbia River basin tribes and bands, (5) that
the Corps intended to repatriate the remains to those tribes, (6) that
notice had been given to certain Indian tribes, (7) that
'[r]epresentatives of any other Native American Tribe which
believes itself to be culturally affiliated with these human remains
should contact the Corps of Engineers prior to October 23, 1996,'
and (8) that repatriation may begin after this date if no additional
claimants come forward.3'
After the notice was published, the Corps began receiving letters from
scientists who objected to the repatriation in the interest of scientific study and
who wanted the Corps to reconsider repatriating the remains to the Coalition.32
Since the Corps did not timely respond to the scientists' letters of concern and
the date of repatriation was fast approaching, the group of scientists (the
scientist plaintiffs or the plaintiffs) filed suit to temporarily stop the
repatriation.33
26. Crowther, supra note 4, at 277.
27. Id.
28. Id.







A second set of plaintiffs, the Asatru Folk Assembly (the Asatru plaintiffs),
also filed suit against the defendants.34 The Asatru plaintiffs opposed the
repatriation to the Coalition on the grounds that the Kennewick Man was not
an ancestor of the Coalition, but of the Asatru plaintiffs. 5 Since the cases of
the two sets of plaintiffs were nearly identical, the court wrote only one
opinion.36 However, this note will discuss only the arguments and decisions
that concern the scientist plaintiffs.
2. Bonnichsen 37
The scientist plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon, asking for a temporary restraining order which would stop
the Corps from repatriating Kennewick Man to the Coalition.3" The scientist
plaintiffs "demanded a detailed scientific study to determine the origins of the
man before the Corps decided whether to repatriate the remains."39 The
scientist plaintiffs also asked the court to "enjoin alleged violations of
NAGPRA, to declare the agency actions at issue null and void, and for an
injunction to prevent defendants from 'depriving plaintiffs from access to
[Kennewick] Man.' ""
After a hearing on the scientist plaintiffs' requests, the Corps told the court
that the agency would notify all plaintiffs at least fourteen days before
repatriation.4 After that hearing, the Corps moved to dismiss the action based
on several grounds, including allegations that the scientist plaintiffs' claim
was not ripe for judicial review, that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim.42
When alleging that the plaintiffs' claims were not ripe and that the
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, the Corps reasoned
that they had not yet made a final decision, so there could be no judicial
review of the decision until the plaintiffs had exhausted all of their
administrative remedies and the Corps had made a final decision concerning
repatriation of the remains.43 The court disagreed with the Corps on this
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 619.
37. Id. at 614.
38. Id. at 618.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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issue." The court focused on the fact that the Corps had published the Notice
of Intent and that the Notice of Intent had contained several decisions that
appeared to be "final."4 The court also stated that at the first hearing, the
Corps "left little doubt that they had decided the remains were Native
American, were subject to NAGPRA, and should be repatriated pursuant to
that statute. '46 Based on these findings, the court determined that there was
a final action by the Corps and that the action could be reviewed by the
court.
4 7
In deciding the issue of whether the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies, the court first looked at the Act to determine what
administrative remedies were available for the plaintiffs under the Act. 8 In
order for a party to seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedures
Act, there must be "both a remedy to exhaust and recourse to that remedy is
required by statute or agency rule."'49 Under the Act, the only parties who
have standing to request a return of remains or artifacts after the determination
that the remains or artifacts are Native American are "a known lineal
descendant of the Native American or of the tribe or organization."5 Based
on the wording of the statute, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs would have
had no standing to file a claim under the Act.51 The court stated:
[T]he requirement that a person file a "claim" for repatriation or
disposition makes sense only if that person is seeking repatriation
or disposition of the remains. It is meaningless in the context of
someone who is opposing repatriation or disposition, and not
merely claiming a superior right to the remains pursuant to
NAGPRA.52
The court held that the action could not be barred for failure on the part of the
plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies when there were no
administrative remedies available to them. 3
44. Id. at 619-25.
45. Id. at 619-20.
46. Id. at 620.
47. Id. at 622.
48. Id. at 623-24.
49. Id. at 623 (citing Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993)).
50. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(1) (2000).
51. Bonnichsen 1, 969 F. Supp. at 623-24.





The Corps also asserted that the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. 4 The court did dismiss the plaintiffs' civil rights
claims based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, but found that the plaintiffs did
have valid claims regarding the assertion that the Corps violated the
provisions of NAGPRA and the assertion that NAGPRA was
unconstitutional."
3. Bonnichsen I1S6
After the court made its ruling granting in part and denying in part the
Corps' motion to dismiss, the Corps made a motion for summary judgment
and the scientist plaintiffs made a motion that they be allowed to study the
remains of Kennewick Man immediately." In its motion for summary
judgment, the Corps once again argued that the scientist plaintiffs lacked
standing to maintain the action 5' and that the agency action was not ripe for
review because there had been no final agency action.59
The Corps argued that the scientist plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain
the action for two reasons.' The Corps' first standing argument was based on
the case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." Citing the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Defenders of Wildlife, the Corps argued that the scientist
plaintiffs could not maintain the action because they had not suffered an injury
in fact and that any perceived injury to the scientist plaintiffs could not be
redressed by the court.62 The Corps' second argument was that the scientist
plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests because they were not part
of the group protected by the Act.63
When analyzing the Corps' first argument, the court compared the facts of
Defenders of Wildlife to the facts of the Bonnichsen II action.' In Defenders
of Wildlife, the plaintiffs were members of the general public who challenged
an agency action that they felt would lead to the possible destruction of certain
54. Id. at 626.
55. Id. at 627-28.
56. Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or. 1997). For the duration of this
note, this case will be referred to as Bonnichsen II.
57. Id. at 632.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 637.
60. Id. at 632.
61. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
62. Bonnichsen II, 969 F. Supp. at 635.
63. Id. at 636.
64. Id. at 633.
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endangered species." The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs in Defenders
of Wildlife lacked standing to maintain an action because they had only a
"mere general grievance or interest that is shared by the world at large."6 6 The
Bonnichsen II court easily distinguished the facts of Defenders of Wildlife
from the Bonnichsen II facts. The court stated that:
Unlike the affiants in Defenders of Wildlife, the Bonnichsen [II]
plaintiffs have presented concrete plans, including a detailed
description of the tests that each plaintiff proposes to conduct....
Plaintiffs have identified a particular set of remains that they desire
to study, they have presented a concrete plan for conducting those
studies, and they are ready, willing, and able to commence those
tests immediately.67
After reviewing the marked differences in the facts of the two cases, the court
held that the scientist plaintiffs had suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to
confer standing.68
The Corps' further argued that based on Defenders of Wildlife even if the
scientist plaintiffs had suffered some type of injury, there was no way for that
injury to be redressed by a decision favorable to the scientist plaintiffs by the
Bonnichsen 11 court.69 The Corps argued "that the injury will not be redressed
by a favorable ruling in this case, since plaintiffs will not have an absolute
right to study the remains."7 The court did not agree with the Corps'
characterization of this issue.7 The court reasoned that, if there was a
decision favorable to the scientist plaintiffs, there was a "likely" chance that
they would be allowed to study the remains and their injury would be
redressed.72
The Corps' second standing argument was that the scientist plaintiffs "[did]
not fall within the 'zone of interest' sought to be protected or regulated by
NAGPRA."7 To fall within a statute's "zone of interest", a plaintiff must
establish that it is among the group of whose interests the provision was
65. Id.
66. Id. at 634.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 635-36.




73. Id. at 636.
[Vol. 28
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intended to protect.74 The Corps argued that the only parties who fall within
NAGPRA' s "zone of interest" are parties seeking to have awarded to them the
rights to human remains or cultural objects covered by the Act.75 However, the
court found nothing in the Act that would preclude a party from contesting an
agency action that denied the party the rights to human remains.76 The court,
therefore, held that the scientist plaintiffs' claims were not precluded by the
"zone of interest" rule.77
The Corps also argued that the scientist plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed
because the Corps' decision to repatriate the remains was not a final agency
action, so the decision was not ripe for review.78 After the court entered its
opinion in Bonnichsen I, the Corps rescinded its original notice of intent by
publishing a "Notice Rescinding Notice of Intent to Transfer Custody of Human
Remains in the Custody of the U.S. Army Corps Engineers, Walla Walla
District" on March 23, 1997.79 Based on this notice, the Corps argued that they
had rescinded the original decision to immediately repatriate the remains to the
Coalition. ° Thus, it was obvious that there had been no final agency action.8
However, the scientist plaintiffs argued that the notice was a "sham" that the
Corps published so they could argue the issue of ripeness.8 2
The court questioned the Corps' classification of the argument as a question
of ripeness.83 Instead, the court reasoned, the issue was "whether as a result of
the March 23rd notice, this case is now moot. ' The court, however, looked at
the Corps' conduct as a whole when deciding this issue, not just the notice
published March 23.85 After publishing the notice to rescind, the Corps filed
two memoranda with the court.8 6 The first, filed on April 23, 1997, stated:
Because Kennewick Man is either of or related to the indigenous
peoples [of America], the remains fit within the definition of Native





78. Id. at 637.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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plaintiffs' own scenario, the remains fit within NAGPRA's
definition of Native American, the only conclusion is that they are
subject to NAGPRA. 87
The Corps filed another memorandum on April 25 stating its opposition to the
scientist plaintiffs' motion to be allowed to study the remains.88 This
memorandum stated:
Because there is no provision for scientific studies under the
disposition provisions of NAGPRA, there is no right to conduct
scientific studies where those provisions apply. Because those
provisions apply to the present case, there is no right to study here.89
The court noted that the position of the notice to rescind was directly
contradicted by the statements in the memoranda filed with the court.9° The
Corps could not ask the court to believe that there had been no final agency
action based on the face of the notice to rescind, and then file documents with
the court stating that the remains were definitely subject to NAGPRA. 9' The
scientist plaintiffs also introduced evidence of several other instances of conduct
by the Corps that directly contradicted the Corps' position that no final agency
action had taken place.92
The court reviewed the standards it must follow when determining whether
an action has become moot.93 After reviewing these standards and applying
them to the circumstances of the case before it, the court determined that the
Corps had not met its burden of proving that the action had become moot.94
Therefore, the court held that the action was not moot and should not be
dismissed as such.95
Upon denying the Corps' motion for summary judgment, the court ordered
the Corps to vacate all of its previous decisions concerning Kennewick Man and
remanded the matter to the Corps for further investigation." The court
instructed the Corps to ensure that, on remand, it apply the proper legal
87. Id. (quoting April 23rd Memorandum to the Court from Defendants at page 5.)
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting April 25th Memorandum to the Court from Defendants at page 23.)
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 639.
93. Id. at 639-40.
94. Id. at 641.
95. Id.




standards when arriving at a new decision, and that the new decision be clearly
supported.97 The court also declared that the Corps should consider the scientist
plaintiffs' request to study the remains when arriving at a new decision.98
The court went on to discuss the scientist plaintiffs' motion to be allowed to
study the remains and the scientist plaintiffs' First Amendment and Equal
Protection claims. 9 The court denied the motion to study the remains, but stated
that the scientist plaintiffs could renew their motion after the Corps had reached
a decision on remand."° However, the court declined to rule on the scientist
plaintiffs' other claims, stating that the plaintiffs could pursue these claims on
remand and suggesting that the Corps should consider these claims when
arriving at a new decision.'"'
The court submitted a non-exclusive list of issues for the Corps to consider
on remand. 2 The court also ordered the parties to submit reports to the court
quarterly to keep the court informed of the process on remand.0 3 The Corps
was ordered to maintain the remains "in a manner that preserves their potential
scientific value."'" The court stayed the action pending a decision on remand
and retained jurisdiction over the matter.'0 5
4. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - Second Decision to Repatriate
Following the court's remand to the agency, several events occurred. There
was a great deal of controversy regarding the Corps' treatment of the remains.l°
Based on the Corps' obvious lack of ability to properly care for the remains, the
court ordered that the remains be moved to a facility more equipped to deal with
them.0 7 In December 1997, "a team composed of representatives of the Tribal
Claimants, the Corps and other federal agencies, and a team from Washington
State University" completed a restricted study of the discovery site.10 8 However,
97. Id.
98. Id. at 645-46.
99. Id. at 645.
100. Id.
101. Id. at645-51.
102. Id. at 651-54.
103. Id. at 645.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 654.
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no further study of the discovery site was ever authorized or completed by the
Corps.'O°
In March 1998, the Corps entered into an agreement with the Department of
the Interior." ° The agreement basically assigned to the Department of the
Interior the responsibility for dealing with Kennewick Man, placing the
Department of the Interior in the "role of lead agency" for the purposes of
deciding the issues in the case."'
In April 1998, the discovery site was buried by the Corps." 2 The original
plan to bury the discovery site was proposed in 1996, but was stayed during the
first phase of the litigation. 3 After the court's remand, the Corps buried the site
despite public protest and legislation that had been introduced to stop the Corps
from going forth with the burial unless it had permission from the court. "4 The
Corps has refused to allow further study of the discovery site."'
In January 2000, the Department of the Interior (the Department) revealed
that it had determined that the remains were Native American for the purposes
of NAGPRA.1 6 The Department's experts based its determination on "the age
of the remains, and their discovery within the United States."'" 7 Then, on
September 25, 2000, the Department revealed that it would repatriate the
remains to the Coalition and denied the scientist plaintiffs any opportunity to
study the remains."' The plaintiff scientists proceeded to file an Amended
Complaint that challenged the second decision to repatriate."'
III. Bonnichsen 111120
The scientist plaintiffs made several claims in their Amended Complaint.
The first claim that the court addressed sought judicial review, pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of the Corps' second decision to repatriate
the remains. 2 ' The court reviewed the standards that must be met in order for
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1126.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1124.
113. Id. at 1125.
114. Id. at 1125-26.
115. Id. at 1126.




120. Id. at 1116.




a party to obtain judicial review under the APA. 22 The court stated that "since
the time the Corps took possession of the remains of the Kennewick Man,
Defendants have not acted as the fair and neutral decision makers required by
the APA."'23 Based on this observation, the court decided that it would be of no
use to remand the case to the agencies for further decision making and that it
would be in the best interest of all of the parties if the issues were decided.'24
The second claim addressed by the court was the allegation by the scientist
plaintiffs that the defendants, when arriving at their decision to repatriate, had
violated NAGPRA.'25 NAGPRA defines Native American as "of, or relating to,
a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States."' 26 The court
noted that the definition used by the defendants when determining the cultural
affiliation of the remains was 'Native American' refers to any remains or other
cultural items that existed in the area now covered by the United States before
1492."' 127 The court reasoned, based on the definition used by the defendants,
that any remains found within the borders of the present-day United States that
are deemed to be older than 5 10 years would be considered "Native American"
when applying NAGPRA, regardless of whether the remains can be tied to any
modem "tribe, people or culture."128 After reviewing the language of NAGPRA,
the court declared there was no evidence that Congress intended for the
definition of Native American to be as broad as the Department had
interpreted. 29
The court went on to note that the Department's decision concerning the
Native American status of Kennewick Man could only be overturned by the
court if "the administrative record contains insufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that the remains are related to a present-day tribe, people, or culture
that is indigenous to the United States as required by the statute."' 30 In order to
support a determination that remains are Native American, a party must show
that one of two different relationships is present:
The first is the general relationship to a present-day tribe, people, or
culture that establishes that a person or item is "Native American."
122. Id. at 1131-32.
123. Id. at 1134.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1131.
126. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (2000).
127. Bonnichsen 111, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1137.
130. Id.
No. 1]
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The second, more narrowly defined specific relationship establishes
that a person or item defined as "Native American" is also
"culturally affiliated" with a particular present-day tribe. 3 '
Based on this requirement, the Department was required to build a record that
included evidence that Kennewick Man was tied in some way to an existing
tribe.'32 The court completed a careful review of the Department's record that
supported its decision and found no evidence that Kennewick Man tied to any
particular existing tribe.'33 According to the court, "Kennewick Man's culture
is unknown and apparently unknowable."'" After this careful review of the
Department's administrative record, the court held that there was no evidence
that support the Department's determination that Kennewick Man was Native
American for the purposes of NAGPRA. "' Therefore, the Act did not apply to
Kennewick Man. 1
36
Because the court decided that NAGPRA did not apply to Kennewick Man
based on the lack of a general relationship with any existing tribe, it was
unnecessary for the court to discuss any of the scientist plaintiffs' other
claims. '37 However, in the interest of "creating a complete record for possible
appellate review" the court went on to discuss several of the scientist plaintiffs'
other claims.' 38 The court provided a detailed discussion of the second
relationship - the "cultural affiliation" relationship - discussed above. "
In order to prove that cultural affiliation exists between remains and a tribe,
a party must have evidence of"a relationship of shared group identity which can
reasonably be traced . . . between a present day Indian tribe . . . and an
identifiable earlier group."'" The court reviewed the record and found that the
Department:
(a) did not adequately determine "an identifiable earlier group" to
which the Kennewick Man allegedly belonged, or even establish that
he belonged to a particular group, (b) did not adequately address the
requirement of a "shared group identity," (c) did not articulate a
131. Id. at 1137-38.




136. Id. at 1138-39.
137. Id. at 1139.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1139-56.




reasoned basis for the decision in light of the record, and (d) reached
a conclusion that is not supported by the reasonable conclusions of
the Secretary's experts or the record as a whole.1 '
As such, the court stated that the Department had not presented evidence in its
record sufficient to prove a cultural affiliation between Kennewick Man and the
Coalition.'42 As such, the Department's determination that Kennewick Man
should be repatriated to the Coalition had to be set aside.'43
After briefly discussing the scientist plaintiffs' other claims, the court
discussed what remedy would be given to the scientist plaintiffs' based on the
court's finding that Kennewick Man was not subject to NAGPRA.'" The usual
remedy for a judicial review of an agency decision is remand to the agency for
further investigation and action. 45 However, the court noted that because this
case had been so unusual, there was no reason to rely on the usual remedy. 46
The court stated that, based on the entire record of proceedings, it was apparent
that "the agency was consistently biased, acted with obvious disregard for even
the appearance of neutrality, and predetermined the outcome of critical
decisions, including the ultimate disposition of the remains."'47 Another factor
the court looked at when determining that remand was not a proper remedy was
the fact that the court had already remanded the action to the agency once to no
avail. 4 8 For those reasons, the court vacated the Department's decision and
ordered that the scientists plaintiffs be allowed to study Kennewick Man.' 49
IV. Recent Developments in the Kennewick Man Case
After U.S. Magistrate John Jelderks entered his ruling on August 30, 2002,
Nez Perce, Umatilla, Colville and Yakama tribes asked for and received
Jelderks' permission to file an appeal of the case, because the Coalition believed
that the United States did not properly represent the interest of the tribes. 5° The
141. Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Or. 2002).
142. Id. at 1143.
143. Id. at 1156.
144. Id. at 1164-67.





150. Richard L. Hill, U.S. Plans to Appeal Kennewick Man Ruling, OREGONIAN (Portland),
Oct. 30, 2002, at B4.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
tribes and the United States both timely filed appeals. 5 ' The appeals will be
heard by the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.1
52
The tribes had also asked Jelderks to delay allowing the plaintiff scientists to
study Kennewick Man until the appellate court had made a ruling.'53 In January
2003, Jelderks denied the tribes' request to delay the study. 154 The tribe has
appealed that decision, also.'55 Kennewick Man is currently being preserved at
the Burke Museum in Seattle, studies by the plaintiff scientists cannot
commence until all of the study details have been approved.
56
V. Conclusion
The case of Kennewick Man uncovered several loopholes that can be
encountered when applying NAGPRA to remains and cultural objects found
within the boundaries of the United States. If parties are allowed to use a
definition similar to the one proposed by the Department of Interior in its
decision to repatriate Kennewick Man, any remains found in the United States
that are older than 510 years old are subject to NAGPRA and must be
repatriated to any tribe that requests repatriation. If this were allowed, it would
be difficult for much meaningful archeological or scientific study of ancient
cultural objects and remains to take place.
For now, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon has
attempted to tighten these perceived loopholes by requiring that an agency must
prove that cultural objects and remains have a cultural relationship with an
existing tribe. It has taken six years for Kennewick Man to make it this far
through the courts, but his legal journey will most likely not be over for several
years.
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